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ABSTRACT
Harms arising from digital data use in the big data context are often systemic and cannot
always be captured by linear cause and effect. Individual data subjects and third parties
can bear the main downstream costs arising from increasingly complex forms of data
uses—without being able to trace the exact data flows. Because current regulatory
frameworks do not adequately address this situation, we propose a move towards harm
mitigation tools to complement existing legal remedies. In this article, we make a
normative and practical case for why individuals should be offered support in such
contexts and how harm mitigation tools can achieve this. We put forward the idea of
‘Harm Mitigation Bodies’ (HMBs), which people could turn to when they feel they
were harmed by data use but do not qualify for legal remedies, or where existing legal
remedies do not address their specific circumstances. HMBs would help to obtain a
better understanding of the nature, severity, and frequency of harms occurring from
both lawful and unlawful data use, and they could also provide financial support in some
cases. We set out the role and form of these HMBs for the first time in this article.
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.
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Mustafa’s case
Mustafa loves good coffee. In his free time, he often browses high-end coffee
machines that he cannot currently afford but is saving for. One day, travelling to a
friend’s wedding abroad, he gets to sit next to another friend on the plane. When
Mustafa complains about how much he paid for his ticket it turns out that his friend
paid less than half of what he paid. Mustafa googles possible reasons for this and con-
cludes that it must be related to his browsing expensive coffee machines and equip-
ment. He is very angry about this and complains to the airline, who send him a
lukewarm apology that refers to dynamic and personalised pricing models. Mustafa
feels that this is unfair but does not challenge it because pursuing this would make
him lose time and money.
Paula’s case1
After years of trying to conceive, Paula is pregnant. Five months into the preg-
nancy she suffers a miscarriage of pregnancy. Paula and her partner are heartbroken.
For months after the end of her pregnancy Paula keeps receiving advertisements from
shops specialised in maternity and infant products and services congratulating her on
the ‘milestones’ of her supposed baby. This is an immensely aggravating and distress-
ing experience for Paula and her partner. Paula’s partner calls up the companies that
send these advertisements, demanding them to erase their names from their database.
He also demands to hear where they got Paula’s contact details in the first place, but
he does not receive any answers. Paula suspects that one of her doctors passed on her
details to retailers, but she cannot prove it.
I . INTRODUCTION
These brief vignettes demonstrate the potential for individuals to be harmed by data
use in the big data era particularly, given the pervasive nature of such data. The ‘perva-
siveness’2 of data means that in the context of large, digital, connected or connectable,
and often fast-changing datasets, harms are often systemic and cannot be captured
by linear cause and effect. Downstream harms arising from digital data use can
fall outside of the remit of traditional legal remedies because they do not fit the
traditional chain of causality which legal actions often require—such as under the tort
of misuse of private information in the UK context,3 or for some actions under the
1 This vignette is inspired by Mary Ebeling’s important book: Mary F.E. Ebeling, Healthcare and Big Data:
Digital Specters and Phantom Objects (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
2 See <https://pervade.umd.edu/about/data-ethics-regulators/> accessed 8 April 2019 and Jacob Metcalf,
‘“The Study Has Been Approved by the IRB”: Gayface AI, Research Hype and the Pervasive Data Ethics
Gap’ (2017) (Medium, 30 November 2017) <https://medium.com/pervade-team/the-study-has-been-ap
proved-by-the-irb-gayface-ai-research-hype-and-the-pervasive-data-ethics-ed76171b882c> accessed 8 April
2019.
3 This tort was recognised by the UK courts in Vidal-Hall v Google [2014] EWHC 13 (QB), which allowed
data subjects to bring a claim against data controllers for compensation in cases of distress caused by data
use. In this case, the claimants’ online browsing activities were tracked by Google and used to profile the
claimants and then direct targeted advertisements to them. The claimants complained of the distress they
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new European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),4 or for the right to
private and family life (Art 8 European Convention on Human Rights). Specifically, peo-
ple who experience harms that they can plausibly assume stem from data use may not
have access to legal remedies for two reasons: First, because the action that led to the
harm was lawful—such as in the case of Mustafa, who was affected by personalised pricing
practices that many people may consider unfair,5 but that are not unlawful. Secondly,
even if it is apparent that the action that caused the harm must have been unlawful (such
as in Paula’s case, where somebody must have infringed data protection laws and passed
on her information to retailers), it may be impossible to prove that a specific instance of
data use caused a specific harm, and therefore the chain of causation required for some le-
gal remedies may be lacking.6 This may be because the harm was caused not only by a sin-
gle specific use of that individual’s data but also by the use of data from different sources
in combination, or where harm to a specific individual resulted from the use of another
individual’s data, without the former being at all aware of this usage. Digital data are also
multiple in the sense that they can be in more than one place at once, and that they can
be interlinked in various ways,7 which makes it extremely difficult to trace the movements
of data in specific cases. These circumstances can leave individual data subjects, such as
Mustafa and Paula, and third parties unable to prove causal links between data use(s) and
the harm suffered, leaving them to bear the downstream costs in the form of harms arising
from increasingly complex forms of data uses—without clear legal remedies.
At the same time, downstream costs on data controllers, who often derive signifi-
cant commercial benefits from such uses, are limited. This amounts to a significant im-
balance of benefits and harms, and, more broadly speaking, of power between data
users and data subjects or third parties.
In view of this situation, a recalibration of data governance is necessary. As part of
a larger programme of thinking about data governance,8 this article makes the case for
suffered based on Google’s use of these characteristics without their consent/knowledge to send targeted
advertisements, and the risk that such personal characteristics could have come to the knowledge of third
parties who used/saw their devices.
4 art 82(1) GDPR 2016/679 provides that: ‘Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as
a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the control-
ler or processor for the damage suffered.’ The GDPR became directly applicable on 25 May 2018.
5 See discussion in: Timothy J Richards, Jura Liaukonyte and Nadia A Streletskayab, ‘Personalized Pricing
and Price Fairness’ (2016) 44 International Journal of Industrial Organization 138.
6 The principles of accountability and responsibility under the GDPR do not displace this point. This is be-
cause for compensation, the controller/processor is exempt if they can prove that the damage is not linked
to their actions. Damage assessment thus depends on causation, as do other aspects.
7 Barbara Prainsack, ‘Data Donation: How to Resist the iLeviathan’ in Jenny Krutzinna and Luciano Floridi
(eds), The Ethics of Medical Data Donation (Springer 2019) 9–22.
8 The programme is outlined in Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach to the
Governance of Research Biobanks’ (2013) 21(1) Medical Law Review 71; Barbara Prainsack and Alena
Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond (CUP 2017); Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, ‘Thinking
Ethical and Regulatory Frameworks in Medicine from the Perspective of Solidarity on Both Sides of the
Atlantic’ (2016) 37 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 489; Barbara Prainsack, ‘Research for Personalised
Medicine: Time for Solidarity’ (2017) 36(1) Medicine and Law 87; Gesine Richter and others, ‘Patient
Views on Research Use of Clinical Data Without Consent: Legal, But Also Acceptable?’ (2019) 27
European Journal of Human Genetics 841; Amelia Fiske, Alena Buyx and Barbara Prainsack, ‘Health
Information Counselors: A New Profession for the Age of Big Data?’ (2019) 94(1) Academic Medicine 37;
Gesine Richter and others, ‘Broad Consent for Healthcare-Embedded Biobanking: Understanding and
Reasons to Donate in a Large Patient Sample’ 20(1) Genetics in Medicine 76.
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harm mitigation tools to complement existing legal frameworks. In doing so, we put
forward a normative and practical rationale for why individuals should be offered sup-
port in such contexts, and why systems for monitoring such ‘harms’ should be estab-
lished. We envisage these functions being conducted by ‘Harm Mitigation Bodies’
(HMBs), which could also establish financial support mechanisms. While two of the
authors have sketched the general idea of such bodies in previous work,9 we set out
the role and form of these HMBs for the first time in this article.
At the outset, we also acknowledge that the adoption of the GDPR takes positive steps
to address some of the issues caused by big data practices. For example, the GDPR’s prin-
ciple of accountability of data controllers moves the onus of proof onto data controllers,
thereby reducing the need for data subjects to demonstrate causation in many contexts.
However, as will be demonstrated, gaps remain and the GDPR’s remit is still too narrow
to provide effective harm mitigation for all data subjects. To address this, the proposed
HMB framework could provide support for harms caused through data use: (i) in cases
where data use did not breach the GDPR and (ii) in countries where the GDPR is not ap-
plicable. Moreover, HMBs would not focus on policing (and placing fines on) data con-
trollers but on providing support to data subjects. They thus complement, rather than
duplicate or compete with, the institutions and instruments of the GDPR.
In making these arguments, the article is structured as follows: Section II sets out
the value of ‘big data’ in today’s world and the challenges it poses for governance. It
puts forward a normative and practical case for a renewed focus on the need for harm
mitigation, and our novel tool to do so, the HMB. Following this, Section III describes
the main functions and legal adaptations of such HMBs, setting out an operational
overview illustrating how these bodies would work within the national data protection
context, their structural composition, etc.
While the arguments were initially developed in the context of the governance of
data for biomedical research and practice, the harm mitigation framework spelled out
here is not limited to the medical domain, but is, in principle, applicable to any in-
stance of data use.
I I . BACKGROUND: BIG DATA AND THE NEED FOR NEW
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS
A. The Context: Big Data in Biomedicine
‘Big data’10 are a key resource for medical research and increasingly also medical prac-
tice in the digital era. Owing to advances in information technologies, it has become
easier to link data from multiple sources and datasets in recent years,11 with many
knock-on benefits for medical research. In the definition of the Garter IT glossary, which
9 Prainsack and Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach’, ibid; Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine, ibid.
10 Defined by the EU Commission as: ‘large amounts of different types of data produced from various types of
sources, such as people, machines or sensors. This data could be climate information, satellite imagery, digi-
tal pictures and videos, transition records or GPS signals. Big Data may involve personal data: that is, any in-
formation relating to an individual, and can be anything from a name, a photo, an email address, bank
details, posts on social networking websites, medical information, or a computer IP address’, see EU
Commission, ‘The EU Data Protection Reform and Big Data: Factsheet’ (January 2016).
11 Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n 8) 11; Henry Pearce, ‘A Systems Approach to Data Protection
Law and Policy in the World of Big Data?’ (2016) 22(4) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 90.
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the UK Information Commissioner’s Office refers to, big data are ‘. . . high-volume, high-
velocity and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of
information processing for enhanced insight and decision making’.12 Big data practices and
epistemologies are hoped to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness in fostering
healthy habits/practices,13 to enable more precise prediction and more successful prevention
of disease, and aid the development of medical interventions,14 both from a commercial
point of view as well as from a public health perspective. Artificial intelligence15 and machine
learning16 techniques are useful to accelerate these benefits and fully ‘unlock the value of big
data’.17 Personal data—understood, in line with Article 4 of the GDPR, as information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person—play important roles in this endeavour.
At the same time, traditional distinctions drawn by data governance frameworks, such
as the distinctions between identified (or identifiable) and anonymous data,18 and between
12 Gartner IT glossary, ‘Big data’ as cited by the UK Information Commissioner Office, who have conceded
that this definition based on the three v’s (volume, velocity, and variety) which has been described as tired
through over use and can be problematic as multiple forms of data do not share the same traits. They
supplement this definition of ‘big data’ by noting that it ‘is useful to regard it as data which, due to several
varying characteristics, is difficult to analyse using traditional data analysis methods’; Information
Commissioner’s Office, ‘Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data Protection’
(September 2017) Version 2.2, 6 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-
data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf.> accessed 8 April 2019.
Some have also discussed definitions based on four and five v’s adding value and veracity, see Jonathan
Shaw, ‘Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal: Information Science Promises to Change the World’ Harvard
Magazine (March–April 2014) <http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal>
accessed 21 May 2018; Steve Lohr, ‘The Age of Big Data’ The New York Times (11 February 2012)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html> accessed 21
May 2018; Svetlana Sicular, ‘Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be Confused
with Three “V”s’ Forbes (27 March 2013) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gart
ners-big-data-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs/> accessed 8 April 2019.
See also Big Data, GARTNER <https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/> accessed 8 April 2019;
Chris Forsyth, ‘For Big Data Analytics There’s No Such Thing as Too Big: The Compelling Economics and
Technology of Big Data Computing’, (4sythcomm.com, March 2012) <https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/
en/us/solutions/data-center-virtualization/big_data_wp.pdf> as cited in Tal Z Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The
GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2018) 47 Seton Hall Review 995, 999.
13 Fabrico F Costa, ‘Big Data in Biomedicine’ (2014) 19(4) Drug Discovery Today 433.
14 Charles Auffray and others, ‘Making Sense of Big Data in Health Research: Towards an EU Action Plan’
(2016) 71(8) Genomic Medicine 1, 3.
15 Defined as ‘. . . the analysis of data to model some aspect of the world. Inferences from these models are
then used to predict and anticipate possible future events’ in Government Office for Science, Artificial intel-
ligence: opportunities and implications for the future of decision making (9 November 2016) as cited by
Information Commissioner’s Office (n 12) 6.
16 Defined as ‘the set of techniques and tools that allow computers to “think” by creating mathematical algo-
rithms based on accumulated data’ in Deb Landau, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How
Computers Learn’ (iQ, 17 August 2016) as cited in the Information Commissioner’s Office (n 12) 7.
17 Information Commissioner’s Office (n 12) 8.
18 On the difficulties of anonymisation in the big data era, see Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n
8) 11. See also Graeme Laurie and Leslie Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the
Governance and Use of Administrative Data in the United Kingdom’ (2016) 44(3) Journal of Law and
Society 360, 368 citing the following: Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization’ (2009) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701; Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly
Shmatiko, De-Anonymizing Social Networks’ (30th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2009)
<https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak09.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019; Paul M. Schwartz and
Daniel J. Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information’
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sensitive and non-sensitive data,19 are increasingly difficult to operationalise in the big data
era given the increased sharing, copying, and linking of data and datasets, and because of
the aforementioned multiplicity of digital data—the fact that they can be in more than one
place at the same time. If combined with sufficient additional data and information, virtually
any data point is identifiable. Moreover, data representing even the most innocuous kind of
information could be used in conjunction with other data to reveal sensitive information,
thereby increasing the risk of harming people.20 It has been argued that in the digital era,
any data should be regarded as potentially identifiable, health related, and sensitive.21 In ad-
dition, big data allows greater emphasis on ‘insights obtained at the aggregate level to be
used to make probabilistic “predictions”’ about individuals and groups,22 leading to chal-
lenging questions about who gets to make—and further use—such predictions, for what
purposes, and under which safeguards.
B. The Problem: Challenges for the Governance of Human Data
Left Unaddressed by the GDPR
The regulatory response to challenges posed by big data has tended towards the fossil-
isation, imitation, or mimesis23 of traditional concepts and instruments such as pri-
vacy, informed consent, and risk management. Broadly speaking, it has so far sought
to address challenges from big data use by trying to minimise and manage risks of
data use as much as possible, and at the same time, by attempting to increase individ-
ual control over how specific data types are used. This has led to what some have
termed ‘privacy protectionism’24 or a ‘whiplash effect’25 where ‘overly restrictive meas-
ures (especially legislation and policies) are proposed in reaction to perceived harms,
which overreact in order to re-establish the primacy of threatened values, such as pri-
vacy’.26 At the societal level, an overt focus on risk management can increase burdens
for data processing that has the potential to limit data uses, thereby hampering the
(2011) 86 New York University Law Review 1814; Melissa Gymrek and others, ‘Identifying Personal
Genomes by Surname Inference’ (2013) 339 Science 321.
19 For a full discussion of sensitive data and difficulties of definition, Stephanie OM Dyke, Edward S Dove and
Bartha M Knoppers, ‘Sharing Health Related Data: A Privacy Test?’ (2016) 1 NPJ Genomic Medicine
16024; Jacob Metcalf, Emily F Keller and Danah Boyd, ‘Perspectives on Big Data, Ethics and Society’ (The
Council for Big Data, Ethics and Society, 23 May 2016) <http://bdes.datasociety.net/council-output/per
spectives-on-big-data-ethics-and-society/> accessed 8 April 2019.
20 For the varied types and severity of harms that can be caused by big data, see Joanna Reddan and Jessica
Brand, ‘Data Harm Record’<https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/> accessed 8 April 2019.
21 Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n 8) 11. For an interesting discussion of these issues, see
Miranda Mourby and others, ‘Are “Pseudonymised” Data Always Personal Data? Implications of the GDPR
for Administrative Data Research in the UK’ (2018) 34(2) Computer Law and Security Review 222.
22 Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n 8) 97.
23 On the idea of mimesis, see Graeme Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research
Regulation: What Are We Missing in the Spaces In-Between?’ (2017) Medical Law Review 47, 58.
24 Judy Allen and others, ‘Privacy Protectionism and Health Information: Any Redress for Harms to Health?’
(2013) 21(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 473 as cited in Kerina H Jones and others, ‘The Other Side of
the Coin: Harm due to the Non-use of Health-Related Data’ (2017) 97 International Journal of Medical
Informatics 43, 47.
25 Brent D Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Introduction’ in Brent D Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi (eds),
The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data (Springer International Publishing 2016) 1.
26 ibid 1.
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potential benefits of big data—while such measures may not necessarily protect indi-
viduals either.
In addition, at an individual level, focusing on risk management and relying on tra-
ditional concepts such as informed consent is problematic because it could give false
assurances. Even with the highest safeguards and best intentions in place, no data us-
age in the digital age will ever be entirely risk-free;27 nor can there be a guarantee
against predictive use of individual and collective health (and other) information in
ways that can harm people. The emphasis put on increased individual control and risk
minimisation in many current health data governance systems, as useful as this ap-
proach has been to date, is likely to also engender problematic expectations for data
subjects in the new ‘big data’ context, who may feel falsely assured that they have
meaningful control over how their data are used.28 A more explicit focus on harms
and harm mitigation would be in line with the principle of veracity in the governance
of personal data in the digital era.29
More effective harm mitigation mechanisms are particularly important and timely
also because big data usage can lead to harms that have so far not been recognised,
such as those described in Paula’s and Mustafa’s case in the beginning of the article.
Predictive analytics could also lead to poor consumer ratings which in turn result in
the denial of mortgages; predictive health profiles could make finding employment
more difficult or raise insurance premiums, etc.30 Studies have also shown the risks of
‘credit worthiness by association’31 such as where an individual’s credit card limit was
reduced due to predictions based on repayment histories of other people who
shopped in the same stores as that individual had.32 Importantly, harms can occur
also when data processing is lawful, such as in Mustafa’s case, which is a situation that
existing legal remedies do not address.33
Legal systems have tried to adapt to some of the challenges posed by big data. At a
European level, the GDPR under Recital 71 protects against the processing of data
which causes discriminatory effects on people on the basis of ‘racial or ethnic origin, po-
litical opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or
27 See Reddan and Brand (n 20); See also work of PERVADE group on pervasive nature of big data
<https://pervade.umd.edu/> accessed 8 April 2019.
28 Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n 8) 115.
29 Jeantine E Lunshof and others, ‘From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent’ (2008) 9(5) Nature Reviews
Genetics 406.
30 See generally Joanna Redden, ‘Six Ways (and Counting) That Big Data Systems Are Harming Society’ (The
Conversation, 7 December, 2017) <https://theconversation.com/six-ways-and-counting-that-big-data-sys
tems-are-harming-society-88660?utm_content¼buffer0c4fa&utm_medium¼social&utm_source¼twitter.com
&utm_campaign¼buffer> accessed 8 April 2019; See also: Federal Trade Commission, ‘Big Data: A Tool
for Inclusion or Exclusion?’ Understanding the Issues (January 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.
pdf> accessed 8 April 2019; Solon Barocas and Andrew D Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’ (2016)
104 California Law Review 671; Danielle K Citron and Frank A Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89 Washington Law Review 1.
31 Reddan, ibid.
32 Mikella Hurley and Julius Adebayo, ‘Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data’ (2016) 18(1) Yale Journal of
Law and Technology 148.
33 For a running record of data harm examples, see Reddan and Brand (n 20).
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sexual orientation, or processing that results in measures having such an
effect’. However, there are clear limitations to such measures given the way big data
works. The Information Commissioner’s Office (UK) has stated that big data analysts
‘‘will need to find ways to build discrimination detection into their machine learning sys-
tems to prevent such decisions being made in the first place’’34 to comply with issues of
accountability under GDPR. Given the way the technology works, not all potential dis-
criminatory effects will be reasonably foreseeable to allow pre-emptive action.35
The GDPR also gives natural persons the right not to be subjected to decisions
based on profiling under certain circumstances.36 There are, however, numerous
exemptions, and limitations to this, discussed in further detail below.37 It is also note-
worthy that the respective articles of the GDPR (Articles 4(4), 9, and 22; see also
Recitals 71-2) do not protect individuals from their personal information being used
for automated purposes per se; rather it protects them merely from being subjected to
decisions based solely on such automated purposes, eg profiling, without human inter-
vention.38 The result is that the prohibition can potentially be bypassed by involving
humans at some stage in a largely automated process of decision making, for example,
by signing off results suggested by an algorithm.39
Furthermore, under the GDPR, data can only be processed in line with the purpose
it is collected for (purpose limitation),40 but subsequent processing is permissible pro-
vided that it is compatible with this purpose. One such compatible purpose is processing
for statistical purposes; however, uncertainty remains around how this exception will ap-
ply in the big data context.41 To be deemed a statistical purpose, the results should not
34 Information Commissioner’s Office (n 12) para 116.
35 See discussion of risks of discrimination in Rhoen and Feng, ‘Why the “Computer Says No”: Illustrating Big
Data’s Discrimination Risk Through Complex Systems Science’ (2018) 8(2) International Data Privacy
Law 140.
36 Profiling, here, is defined in art 4(4) of the GDPR as ‘any form of automated processing of personal data
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in par-
ticular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situa-
tion, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements’.
37 See also Michael Vaele and Lillian Edwards, ‘Clarity, Surprises, and Further Questions in the Article 29
Working Party Draft Guidance on Automated Decision-Making and Profiling’ (2018) 34(2) Computer
Law & Security Review 398.
38 Rita Heimes, ‘Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 5 – Profiling’ (The Privacy Advisor, 20
January 2016) <https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-5-profiling/>
accessed 8 April 2019.
39 Zarsky (n 12) 1016–17. This can arguably be inferred from the discussion of automated decision-making in
art 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual decision-making and profiling for the purposes
of Regulation 2016/679 adopted on 3 February 2017 WP251.01 <https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_
center/W29-auto-decision_profiling_02-2018.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. These guidelines were en-
dorsed by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) in May 2018<https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/
European-Data-Protection-Board> accessed 25 June 2019. However, the human involvement must be
meaningful - as noted by the Art 29 Working Party guidelines, p. 21: “To qualify as human involvement, the
controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than just a token gesture. It
should be carried out by someone who has the authority and competence to change the decision.”
40 art 5(1)(b) GDPR and art 6(4) GDPR.
41 For a discussion of the likely difficulties, this will pose for big data, see Zarsky (n 12) 1008; Antoinette
Rouvroy, ‘“Of Data and Men’: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a World of Big Data’ (Council of
Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 11 January 2016) 11 <https://rm.coe.int/
16806a6020> accessed 25 June 2019.
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be used ‘in support of measures or decisions regarding any particular natural person’.42
However, in practice it may be impossible to prevent data users to use findings from
data analytics that identify an association (or even a causal connection43) between two
parameters in such a way that they apply to specific individuals.
Either as part of implementing the GDPR into their national legal systems, or addi-
tionally, many countries currently attempt to introduce legislation curbing or at least lim-
iting the use of predictive analytics in healthcare systems.44 Although these solutions are
a welcome step, they are not sufficient to address the problem described above for four
reasons: first, potential harms caused by the use of data in this way often fall outside the
remit of governance frameworks using traditional legal concepts.45 As demonstrated by
Metcalf and other colleagues’ work on the pervasive nature of big data, harms are often
systemic in nature and may have effects on multiple individuals downstream.46 For exam-
ple, a person who is harmed by a predictive analytics system that makes probabilistic
inferences regarding an undesirable trait on the basis of generic information about her—
such as the postcode she lives in—does not have access to legal remedies if the data that
were used to make these inferences are not her own personal data. Secondly, even when
it is clear that a particular harm must have resulted from a breach of the law—such as in
the case of Paula described in the beginning of the article—individuals might not be able
to prove the relevant causal link required for traditional tort-based remedies to apply, or
for the purposes of establishing a right to compensation under the GDPR. This is be-
cause multiple digital copies of data sets may exist whose movements cannot be traced,
or because the pervasive nature of digital data may make it easier for data controllers or
processers to prove they are not responsible for the event. Thirdly, according to the
GDPR, even when data controllers fail to take sufficient steps to avoid discrimination
against people and, as a result, they can be held accountable for breach of the GDPR,
existing frameworks impose penalties for mis- and abuse of data that are often too low to
deter bad practice on the side of data controllers.47 And fourthly, Article 80 GDPR pro-
vides that non-profit bodies active in the privacy context can initiate claims of infringe-
ment by data subjects, and allows for the potential for group actions—if such bodies
gather multiple claims on similar issues from data subjects.48 This measure could be used
42 Recital 162, GDPR. See discussion in Zarsky (n 12) 1008; Rouvroy, ibid; for an alternative view, see Viktor
Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Yann Padova, ‘Regime Change? Enabling Big Data Through Europe’s New Data
Protection Regulation’ (2016) 17 Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 315, 329
43 Miguel A Herna´n, John Hsu and Brian Healy, ‘Data Science Is Science’s Second Chance to Get Causal
Inference Right: A Classification of Data Science Tasks’ (2018) arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.10846.
44 For example, see adapted German Data Protection Law.
45 Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n 8) 98. See also Mark Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: A
Critical Perspective on Privacy Protections (CUP 2013).
46 See Reddan and Brand (n 20); See also work of PERVADE group on pervasive nature of big data
<https://pervade.umd.edu/> accessed 8 April 2019.
47 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information (Harvard
University Press 2015) 91. Under the GDPR, organizations in breach of the GDPR can be fined up to 4%
of annual global turnover or e20 million (whichever is greater). However, whether this will be sufficient to
deter mis/abuse remains to be seen.
48 See also Recital 142, GDPR. For a discussion, see Kellie O’Flynn, ‘Has the GDPR Opened the Door to
Class Actions in Ireland?’ (27 August 2018) <https://www.williamfry.com/newsandinsights/news-article/
2018/08/27/has-the-gdpr-opened-the-door-to-class-actions-in-ireland> accessed 8 April 2019. The first
such complaints under art 80 GDPR were lodged by Max Schrems group ‘None of Your Business’ (NOYB)
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as a collective support mechanism for individuals, but shortfalls remain, namely: first, it
will be left to each Member State to devise such mechanisms for non-profit actions in na-
tional jurisdictions, which could lead to variance of approaches; secondly, such bodies
would also still only be able to take actions based on the infringement of the GDPR.
All these aspects underscore the need for additional mechanisms of support,
namely for the introduction of HMBs. Such HMBs would complement regulation by
focusing on supporting data subjects who were harmed by data use, irrespective of
who caused the harm, of whether or not they are able to prove a causal connection,
and irrespective of whether the action or omission that led to the harm was unlawful.
C. Why Better Harm Mitigation Is Needed in the Digital Era
Alongside other colleagues we thus argue that the current approach to data gover-
nance needs to change.49 In previous publications, two of the authors of this article
(Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx)50 have argued that new approaches to big data
governance should be based on the concept of solidarity,51 and that they should in-
clude three main pillars: (i) greater emphasis on whether or not specific instances of
data use are in the public interest, (ii) the strengthening of harm mitigation instru-
ments, and (iii) new legal mechanisms to ensure that significant parts of financial prof-
its created on the basis of data use go into the public purse (eg via a corporate data
use tax). In this article, we will focus on pillar (ii) harm mitigation. As noted, the ac-
count of harm mitigation that we develop in the following sections can be adapted to,
and support, the governance of any data use, not limited to health, and within any
kind of regulatory and governance landscape. In other words, although the idea of
HMBs and their accompanying financial support mechanisms was conceived in con-
nection with solidarity-based governance,52 enhancing harm mitigation is an essential
task in the era of digital data, irrespective of whether other instruments of solidarity-
based governance are employed or not.
We argue that there are important normative and practical rationales for establish-
ing HMBs. At the normative level, harm mitigation forms a key step that governance
in May 2018. See <https://noyb.eu/4complaints/> accessed 25 June 2019; the actions were against
Google, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram. The action against Google has led to a decision in January
2019 by CNIL (the French Data Protection Commission) fining Google e50 million; see <https://www.
cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc>
accessed 25 June 2019.
49 See also Pasquale (n 47); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will
Transform How We Live, Work and Think (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2013); Dana Boyd and Kate
Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological and Scholarly
Phenomenon’ (2012) 15(2) Information, Communication and Society 662; Nir Kshetri, ‘The Emerging
Role of Big Data in Key Development Issues: Opportunities, Challenges, and Concerns’ (2014) 1 Big Data
& Society 1; Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and Consent’
in Judith Lane and others (eds), Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (CUP
2014); Paul Ohm, ‘Changing the Rules: General Principles for Data Use and Analysis’ in Judith Lane and
others, Privacy, Big Data and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (CUP, 2014).
50 Prainsack and Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach’ (n 8); Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine
(n 8).
51 For a definition, see Prainsack and Buyx, ‘Thinking Ethical and Regulatory Frameworks’ (n 8) 493; see also
Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine (n 8).
52 Prainsack and Buyx, ‘Thinking Ethical and Regulatory Frameworks’ (n 8); Prainsack (n 8); Prainsack and
Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach’ (n 8).
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frameworks need to shift towards strengthening not only individual but also collective
control and responsibility in the context of data use. We take it as a given, in the inter-
ests of social justice and fairness, that significant inequities in the distribution of bene-
fits and burdens, as well as large power imbalances in societies, need to be remedied.
Improved mechanisms and instruments of collective control and responsibility for
data use are necessary to counteract the growing imbalances between those who give
data and those who use them. Strengthening collective responsibility also includes im-
proving the support of individuals and groups of people who are harmed by data use.
And this, in turn, leads us to emphasise the need for better harm mitigation
instruments.53
In our view, HMBs will help to protect people from the downstream costs—in the
widest sense of the word—of personal data use in the digital era to a greater extent
than is currently the case. For individuals, big data entails upfront costs (the costs re-
lated to curating and using datasets, which they share with public and private corpora-
tions that provide the technologies and infrastructures for the generation of data) and
downstream costs in terms of harms caused by data use. Under current regulatory
frameworks, as described, these downstream costs for data use in the digital era are
carried largely by individual members of the public and by publics, whereas the com-
mercial benefits unfold mostly for such privately owned corporations. HMBs would
seek to reduce the downstream costs for individuals/publics, and thus contribute to a
mitigation of imbalances in power and benefits and burdens between publics and pri-
vate actors. While this is not an argument against private corporations making profits
from personal data use in principle, the difference in power, agency, and costs borne
by corporations that use data on the one hand, and the people who contribute data
on the other, is a problem in need of addressing. In some of our other work,54 we
have suggested solutions to ensure that a larger share in profits come back into the
public domain (eg via a data tax). These monies paid by corporations benefitting
from the use of people’s data could and should be used to support the operation of
HMBs.
There is also a practical rationale for HMBs: we argue that HMBs are practically
mandated because no matter how hard we try to reduce risks emerging from novel
ways of data use, some individuals and groups will still inevitably be harmed by these
practices, either intentionally or unintentionally, and both by lawful and unlawful data
use. As noted, existing legal remedies,55 which only protect from the downstream
costs of data use which is unlawful, eg infringes the GDPR,56 and (in some cases)
only if those harmed can prove a causal connection between an act or omission by a
specific entity and the harm incurred, are not sufficient to address this problem.
53 Having said this, we anticipate group claims to be the exception. Furthermore, depending on the size of the
group, it may already have collective agency to a certain extent. In such cases, issues are likely to be resolved
more quickly by a data controller than cases of individual harm given the likelihood of increased concerns
about the public image/legitimacy of the data controller.
54 Prainsack and Buyx, ‘Thinking Ethical and Regulatory Frameworks’ (n 8); Prainsack (n 8).
55 For example, the tort of misuse of private information in the UK, or data subjects’ rights under ch 3 GDPR
and remedies in cases of unlawful processing art 8 GDPR.
56 Furthermore, scenarios could potentially arise where fines were imposed for breach of GDPR processes, but
individuals would not necessarily obtain compensation unless the infringement led to damage.
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Further difficulties stem from the fact that costs often arise not only for primary data
subjects but also for third parties, ie, for other individuals downstream.57 To address
these issues on a practical level, we need an instrument ancillary to traditional legal
mechanisms, with an explicit focus on harm mitigation. For this system to be effective,
it must be easy for people to use, low on bureaucracy, and flexible enough in its
decision-making system to support people where and how they most need it.
Moreover, although it might be possible that other avenues could be developed to
address the issues described, such as strict liability for data misuse or any use which
causes harm, it is well known by now that serious harms can stem from data use that
does not break any laws. While the harm experienced by Mustafa in the beginning of
the article could be seen as very minor, other legal practices can cause serious harms,
without effective and accessible legal remedies being available to those harmed: a man
whose driver’s licence was revoked after facial recognition technology wrongfully
‘identified’ his photograph as similar to another licence holder and there was suspicion
of identity fraud.58 Another person who typed something into Google that the com-
pany’s autocomplete function added the word ‘bomb’ to was visited by government
investigators and lost his job as a result. In both cases,59 serious harm occurred with-
out either of the men having access to effective legal remedies to provide financial sup-
port for the harm suffered.60
We argue that a harm mitigation model is the most appropriate in the context
described. This is because it could operate flexibly and would offer an important
balance of supporting individuals who may suffer harms and seeking to limit
these harms, regardless of whether these harms stem from lawful or unlawful data
uses, and irrespective of whether the harmed individuals can prove a causal connec-
tion between a specific act or omission and the harm incurred. Furthermore, the more
informal nature of HMBs, as laid out in the following sections, may help to address
the problem that it is often the most socio-economically deprived groups that are
most likely to be harmed by data uses. These groups regularly have fewer resources
(both in terms of financial resources and access to legal advice) to avail themselves of
traditional legal remedies and mount legal challenges against particular data uses,
thus potentially further worsening the aforementioned imbalances. Finally, the
HMB model would provide an avenue for individuals (and groups) to feed issues of
57 See also PERVADE project <https://pervade.umd.edu/about/data-ethics-regulators/> accessed 8 April
2019.
58 See discussion in Luke Dormehl, ‘Algorithms Are Great and All But They Can Also Ruin Lives’ (Wired, 19
November 2014) <https://www.wired.com/2014/11/algorithms-great-can-also-ruin-lives/> accessed
8 April 2019.
59 See discussion of these and other similar cases in Luke Dormehl, The Formula: How Algorithms Solve All
Our Problems . . . and Create More (Random House 2014).
60 The victim of the facial recognition mistake was told by authorities that he had the right to request a hearing
but the onus was upon him to prove his identity if he wanted his licence restored. The hearing was held 11
days after the licence suspension, where he submitted relevant documentation and his licence was rein-
stated. Nonetheless, the fact that the licence was suspended in the first place due to algorithmic misidentifi-
cation caused unnecessary harm for him. His subsequent claim for damages based on the incident against
the Register for Motor Vehicles was rejected. See Gass v Registrar of Motor Vehicles 12-P-205 (Mass App Ct
7 January 2013). The fired employee who wanted to build a radio-controlled airplane and was accused of
trying to build a bomb subsequently commenced litigation to try to claim compensation for the job loss suf-
fered. Even where successful, litigation tends to be both highly expensive and time-consuming.
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big data usage back to regulators, thus forming an important element of reflexive gov-
ernance.61 This is vital given the evolving nature of data uses, and how, relatively, little
we know at this point about the nature and severity of harms that stem from these
uses, as well as their prevalence and distribution within and across populations.
I I I . HMBS: FUNCTIONS AND LEGAL ADAPTATIONS
This section introduces HMBs and expands on their main functions in reference to
the GDPR to highlight the complementary nature HMBs could play in addressing
gaps in existing frameworks. We expect these ideas to be developed further over time
by and in response to the community within which HMBs would operate and apply.
A. Introducing HMBs
We envisage HMBs as instruments that specifically address harms to individuals that
are plausibly connected to data use. HMBs have two primary functions, namely: (i) to
provide financial support to individuals who can plausibly make a case that they suf-
fered significant and undue harm by data use (without needing to prove wrongdoing
or direct legal causation due to an acknowledgement that this is increasingly not possi-
ble in the era of digital data)62 and (ii) to monitor harms reported as being caused by
big data practices reported to and within HMBs. This information can then be fed
back to data controllers and to public agencies and inform how the operation of sys-
tems of data governance could be improved.
HMBs would be established at national levels, for example, as independent statu-
tory arms of national data protection bodies. They would have oversight for data uses
pertaining to all data controllers resident (in the case of individuals) or established (in
the case of corporate entities) in that national jurisdiction. All data controllers estab-
lished in a country in question would need to sign up to the national HMB and pay a
certain percentage of their profits (in case of for-profit entities) or their funding (in
case of non-profit entities) to the HMB. HMBs would use these funds to cover their
operating costs, and to establish a financial support mechanism from which people
harmed by data use could make individual petitions to. HMBs would have a reporting
branch and an investigative branch. The latter would also deal with petitions for finan-
cial and other support provided for by the HMBs. The two branches would communi-
cate and coordinate with each other, and indeed a central role of the individual
petition system would be to provide information to the HMB about the nature and
severity of experienced harms. This information could be used to assess patterns of
harms caused by data uses and inform policy around good practice for big data.
61 For a discussion of reflexive governance, see Graeme Laurie, ‘Reflexive Governance in Biobanking: On the
Value of Policy Led Approaches and the Need to Recognise the Limits of Law’ (2011) 130(3) Human
Genetics 347; Shawn Harmon, Graeme Laurie and Gill Haddow, ‘Governing Risk, Engaging Publics and
Engendering Trust: New Horizons for Law and Social Science?’ (2013) 40(1) Science and Public
Policy 25.
62 Similar types of funds can be seen when one looks to landlord risk mitigation funds—these are funds used
to encourage landlords to rent to ‘higher’ risk tenants such as those with lower incomes or with previous
evictions, and in some cases used to tackle issues of homelessness whereby if damages occur, landlords are
reimbursed up to a specified limit. See Katy Miller, ‘Using Incentives to Engage Landlords: Risk Mitigation
Funds’ (15 April 2016) <https://www.usich.gov/news/using-incentives-to-engage-landlords-risk-mitiga
tion-funds> accessed 8 April 2019.
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To respond adequately to individual petitions, there would be multiple investiga-
tion panels within the HMB governed by a group of people who are independent
from the data controller(s). This group—the steering committee—would consist of
legal and data protection experts, but also include lay members, to ensure a varied
membership and reduce the potential for regulatory or institutional capture. There
would also be an appeal board within the HMB, where rejected petitions to the finan-
cial support mechanism could be appealed to and considered.
1. Individual petition procedure
Anyone who perceives that they experienced significant and undue harm by data
use—either through the lawful or unlawful use of their own data, or somebody else’s
data—and who wishes to report this, and/or who wishes to apply for financial support
can do so via an informal individual petition submitted to the HMB. The petition will
be assigned to an investigative panel within the HMB, which will conduct a first re-
view of the case to establish whether the case has the potential on the balance of prob-
abilities to meet three requirements. These requirements are that (i) the claimed
harm is significant, (ii) undue, and (iii) there is a plausible connection between the
harm arising and the data use.
If these criteria have the potential to be met, then the HMB would invite the appli-
cant to provide further information, which the HMB then uses to make a decision on:
(i) whether the case does indeed include significant harm to the applicant. Here we
take significant harms to be those that would be considered significant to a reasonable
person in the individual’s position, or harms that a data controller could reasonably
foresee that a particular data subject would consider to be significant. We adopt this
hybrid subjective/objective test in recognition of the fact that the impact of a particu-
lar harm suffered is dependent on the personal characteristics and factors relating to
the data subject. The assessment of (ii) whether harm is undue depends on whether it
can be justified by a legal requirement that can be considered fair. For example, if an
individual experienced harm on the basis of being included in a criminal investigation
on lawful grounds, and these grounds were fair in that they did not include an implicit
bias against certain groups of people (eg penalising practices that are associated with
poverty), this harm would not necessarily be considered undue. Similarly, harm might
not be undue if somebody signed up to a web service in full knowledge that the web
service did not adhere to good data practice standards (if no laws were broken).
While these are examples of considerations that would have bearing on the decision,
whether or not a specific instance of harm is undue, including the fairness criterion
must be assessed on a case by case basis by the HMB. Discretion, we argue, is needed
because HMBs should be flexible to respond to harms stemming from big data practi-
ces, which are still being uncovered, and which we cannot list in an exhaustive sense
at the outset. Therefore, to maintain a responsive HMB system we cannot, a priori,
prescribe a detailed framework for the assessment of harms. To mitigate against po-
tential risks arising from such discretion, we envisage there being strong procedural
transparency around how HMBs make decisions. This acts as a counterbalance to the
lack of stringent a priori prescriptive rules to determine the significance of harm,
which will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Once HMBs have been in place for
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several years it will then be possible to revisit the framework for assessing harms, and
to distil greater guidelines around what should be considered a significant harm.
Finally, (iii) whether it is plausible to assume a connection between the harm and
specific instances of data use—this is a lower standard than would be employed within
traditional legal remedies, and entails proving whether a reasonable person would
view on the balance of probabilities that it was plausible that the harm could have
resulted (but not proving that it necessarily did result) from the data use outlined.
When first established, we suggest that petitions to HMBs would be confined to
claims from natural persons. This is because HMBs are envisaged to mitigate harms
for individuals and addressing power imbalances, which arise between individuals and
data controllers. Nonetheless, in saying this, we acknowledge that power imbalances
may also negatively affect small- and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, once estab-
lished for natural persons and operating well in this context, at a later point the role of
HMBs might be revisited to consider whether it would be feasible to expand the remit
of HMBs to cover claims from such entities.
In terms of what types of harm(s) we expect people to report, this could include
eg: discrimination, stigma, or the loss of income following unauthorised
reidentification.63 But harm can also occur without undue reidentification of data, and
even without any data having been taken from the person who was harmed. The prac-
tice of predictive analytics, for example, uses insights from one group of people to dis-
cern patterns that will then be applied on other groups of people.64 As a result, those
with ‘risky’ or otherwise undesirable characteristics can be excluded from certain offers
or services, or they can become a target for heightened scrutiny or surveillance (eg
patients who are identified to be particularly likely to overuse emergency rooms on
the basis of predictive analytics).65 Whenever such harms do not give grounds to a
claim within data protection or tort law systems because they are lawful or because it
is impossible for affected parties to prove what act or omission exactly caused the
harm (eg due to data having been used by many different entities and having been
analysed in ways that are not open to scrutiny), individuals could be encouraged to
approach a HMB.66
Alternatively, some people may wish to report harms that they have experienced
which they think are due to data use but may not wish to seek financial or other
63 Reidentification is usually understood as the attempt to match anonymised or deidentified data with pub-
licly available information/data to discover the individual to which the data belong to. It has been shown
that it is possible to reidentify even data that were previously believed to have been stripped of any identify-
ing information. See Prainsack and Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach’ (n 8).
64 For instance, the analysis of other people’s data can lead to the detection of patterns of undesirable charac-
teristics that are then applied to a specific person; and if the person has this undesirable characteristic, she
can experience harm as a result. This mechanism is not new—it has existed in actuarial reasoning in insur-
ance, criminal law, etc for a long time. But the availability of wider sets of digital data covering more aspects
of people’s lives, and the rapid advance of computational tools and methods increase the scale of this prob-
lem. See work on rights of secondary data subjects, including Taylor (n 45).
65 For an overview of such risks from data use, see Pam Dixon and Robert Gellman ‘The Scoring of America:
How Secret Consumer Scores Threaten Your Privacy and Your Future’ (World Privacy Forum, 2014)
<http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_April2014_
fs.pdf> accessed 8 April 2019.
66 Over time, it might also be considered whether to allow individuals to appeal to the HMB if they can make
plausible case that pursuing legal remedies would be too onerous or costly to be reasonably possible.
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support, eg if the harm experienced is not significant but they still want it recorded
and its causes addressed to prevent possible harms to others. A simple, informal feed-
back form would be set up for this purpose and would enable the HMB to fulfil an im-
portant monitoring role. This informal process could be used to prompt
investigations for HMBs and if harms were found to be significant and repeated, find-
ings could feed into regulatory frameworks to address these harms. To increase public
knowledge of the potential for harms arising from data use, public awareness cam-
paigns would need to be established by the government to educate the public, so they
can identify possible harmful practices.
Importantly, HMBs would thus be subsidiary to rather than replace existing legal
protections, thereby filling the aforementioned regulatory gaps created by the digital
era. Regulators and data controllers would still be required to minimise risks as far as
reasonable and practical. Alongside this, HMBs could offer financial and/or other sup-
port to those who are harmed by data use but the claimed harms suffered would not
meet thresholds for legal causation under existing legal remedies—for example, be-
cause no direct causal link between an action of a data controller and the experienced
harm could be proven. In this way, HMBs would fill the existing gaps in traditional le-
gal systems, whilst also serving an important reporting function as patterns of harms
caused by data use investigated can then be assessed and issues identified and fed
back to regulators. HMBs thereby seek to complement available legal remedies in mit-
igating potential negative effects of data use, and also by providing feedback to data
controllers on how systems and procedures could be improved. In EU Member
States, HMBs would complement, rather than compete with or duplicate, the role of
the relevant Data Protection Authority (DPA), which is the independent public au-
thority in each state that supervises the application of data protection law. While the
main role of the DPA is to police data controllers, and while they are limited to cases
that infringe existing laws, HMBs main role would be to support data subjects, and
they would not be limited to instances of unlawful data use. In this area, HMBs could
assist in collecting evidence on the frequency, nature, and severity of harms occurring,
and by analysing this information to help improve data protection, HMBs and DPAs
could and should collaborate on this.
B. Financial Support Function
As noted, HMBs—particularly as institutions that people can appeal to also for finan-
cial support—do not aim to replace existing legal mechanisms for compensation or
redress. Instead, they seek to complement legal systems by providing a low-threshold
instrument for people who feel that the legal system did not, or cannot, address the
harm that they suffered. HMBs could make positive decisions on appeals even if data
users did not infringe any laws or rules. Moreover, if HMBs gave financial support to
applicants, these would not claim to provide full restitution or compensation for all
losses resulting from the harm. In cases where the claimed harm could be quantified
in financial terms, money paid out by HMBs would not necessarily correspond with
those figures either. Instead, money paid by HMBs would be understood as
financial support, not necessarily corresponding with the extent of the actual harm.
The amount provided would, however, aim to reflect the degree and type of harm suf-
fered. In other words, the more significant the harm suffered, the higher the financial
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support offered. This would be assessed on a case-by-case basis. When the system is
first set up, if concerns arose initially on the affordability of the system, the financial
supports offered could be set out as a percentage of losses/costs borne by the individ-
ual, eg 60% of the actual loss/costs, which would reflect the fact that it is a supportive
measure to the individual. It also reflects the informal nature of system, which does
not require legal costs, requires a minimal application process in terms of the data sub-
ject, etc.
Liability under the HMB model is on a no-fault basis such that financial support is
not dependent on proving a violation of law by the data controller. Instead, it is based
on proving a plausible connection between the actions (lawful or unlawful) of the
data controller and the harm suffered. As noted, awards could be made from HMBs
even if the actions of the data controller did not fall foul of any laws, which addresses
concerns raised elsewhere on the need to have broader systems of accountability for
data uses in the biomedical context.67 In this way, HMBs’ financial support mecha-
nisms are distinctly different from traditional constructions of liability, eg in tort law
where liability is generally premised on a breach of duty and standard of care, with a
direct proof of causation between the act in question and harm arising. Instead, in the
HMB context, if an individual experienced harm, they could appeal to an HMB that
would assess whether financial support is warranted based on the abovementioned cri-
teria. In theory, claims could also be made in cases where data controllers’ actions
were not unlawful.
Three key legal questions arise under this framework, namely: (i) the definition
and construction of harm for the purposes of the HMB; (ii) the subsidiary nature of
HMBs and how the system is also designed to address harms falling outside existing
protections, (iii) in cases where the response of the HMB takes the form of support,
including eg financial payments, how the amount of financial support would be
awarded. Taking each of these aspects, in turn, the following can be said.
1. Definition and construction of harm for purposes of HMB
This section uses the European data protection framework as a case study to illustrate
how the conception of ‘harm’ in HMBs differs from existing legal frameworks under
the GDPR and the previous framework under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/
EC. The precise role and influence of the GDPR over UK data protection laws after
the UK leaves the EU are still uncertain, and will depend on the outcome of any
Brexit deal.68 Nonetheless, as of May 2018, the GDPR applies directly also in the UK
until it leaves the EU likely later in 2019, and even after that transitional measures are
67 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘The collecting, Linking and Use of Biomedical Research and Health Care:
Ethical Issues’ (April 2014) [4.46].
68 This position is correct at the time of writing 8 April 2019. If the UK leaves without a deal, the GDPR will
cease to operate in its current form, however, measures including the Draft Data Protection, Privacy and
Electronic Communications (Amendments, etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 have been drafted in the UK
which require governmental approval, but which seek to further align UK data protection laws with the
GDPR post-Brexit. This would allow the UK to apply to the European Commission for an adequacy deci-
sion on UK laws on whether they provide adequate protection for personal data in line with the GDPR. See
discussion at Kingsley Napley, ‘GDPR for the UK: Brexit and International Transfers of Personal Data’
(Lexology, 9 January 2019) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g¼78e1c762-5c01-47d1-aa35-
d2cff2e8991a> accessed 8 April 2019.
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still being negotiated. Furthermore, the UK’s Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 came
into effect in May 2018. This Act replaces the previous DPA 1998, applies GDPR
standards and complements the GDPR by setting out specific rules to supplement its
application in the UK. Therefore, the domestic act will ensure continued application
of provisions contained therein which are related to the GDPR in the UK post-Brexit.
Moreover, even if the GDPR does not apply directly within the UK post-Brexit, the
territorial scope of the GDPR is broader than the previous Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC, and the GDPR applies to all data controllers/processers who are process-
ing personal data of individuals resident in the EU, which is regardless of the control-
lers/processers place of establishment. Given the proximity of the UK to EU markets,
this is still likely to apply to many UK data controllers/processers. This section briefly
sets out the relevant provisions and remedies provided previously by the Data
Protection Directive 1995 (by reference to how these were applied in the UK under
the DPA 1998) considering how the GDPR improves upon these, and also noting the
gaps remaining.
The UK’s DPA 1998, which brought the EU Data Protection Directive 1995 into
national law, stipulated that harms from data use/misuse were legally sanctionable un-
der UK law if recognised under the relevant statute (DPA). Other legal actions were
also relevant in this context, eg data use/misuse may be subject to common law action
for breach of confidentiality or tort of misuse of private information; or it may in
some cases breach rights under the European Convention of Human Rights, of most
relevance here is Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life).69 Data control-
lers who did not abide by standards set out in the DPA 1998 were liable to sanctions.
However, the threshold required to prove harm and the penalties imposed when
harm was established left gaps for data subjects. For example, the penalties imposed
were arguably not severe enough to effectively deter data misuse.70 Moreover, and im-
portantly in the context of big data, the provisions of the DPA 1998 did not apply to
anonymous data, so no legal remedies were available if the use of anonymous data
caused harm. The GDPR improves this situation by expanding the concept of per-
sonal data to include (at least some instances of) ‘pseudonymised data’, ie data that
are neither anonymous nor identifying,71 whereby one attribute in data (usually a
unique identifier) is replaced with another as an extra security measure to reduce the
69 Laurie and others, ‘A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical
Data’, Report for Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the
Wellcome Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (June 2014) 28 <http://nuffieldbioethics.org/
wp-content/uploads/FINAL-Report-on-Harms-Arising-from-Use-of-Health-and-Biomedical-Data-30-JUNE-
2014.pdf> accessed 21 May 2018. See also discussion in art 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the
Concept of Personal Data 01248/07/EN WP 136 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documenta
tion/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019, 18.
70 For a discussion, see Out-Law.com, ‘Jail Sentence Penalties for Data Breaches Will Be Consulted on
Despite Government’s Scepticism’ (11 October 2013) <https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/
October/jail-sentence-penalties-for-data-breaches-will-be-consulted-on-despite-governments-scepticism/
> accessed 8 April 2019; Out-Law.com, ‘Review of UK Data Protection: Should Fines Go over Half a
Mil?’ (Out-Law, 6 March 2014) <https://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/03/06/uk_review_of_data_pro
tection_sanctions_threshold/> accessed 8 April 2019.
71 Moubray and others (n 21).
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risk that the data subject can be identified.72 It thereby extends the potential for
legal remedies for individuals who did not have access to them under the Data
Protection Directive.73 It remains to be seen, however, how this will be implemented
in practice.74 Also, the GDPR does not include fully anonymous data (ie data
where it is assumed that no link to specific individuals can be made)75 under the
remit of personal data and thus leaves those who are harmed by the use of such
data without redress. Furthermore, in distinguishing between anonymised and pseu-
donymised data, a key question will be whether the risk of reidentification is reason-
able,76 which could provide a potential gap in protection, depending on how
‘reasonable’ is interpreted in such contexts, and particularly given ongoing advances in
technology.77
More generally, Laurie and others previously highlighted the narrow framing of
harm under the DPA 1998 whereby individuals had to prove that harm experienced
by them caused either financial damage or distress (emotional suffering) and that this
was of a sufficient degree to constitute a breach of the DPA 1998.78 Under the
GDPR, Recital 82 provides a right to compensation for any person who suffered ‘ma-
terial or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation’, and
compensation can be obtained from the data controller or the processor. There is no
definition of non-material damage; however, Recital 85 GDPR provides guidance, de-
fining potential harms as:
physical, material or non-material damage to natural persons such as loss of con-
trol over their personal data or limitation of their rights, discrimination, identity
theft or fraud, financial loss, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, damage
to reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional
72 art 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ 0829/14/EN WP216 (10 April
2014) 20.
73 Laurie and others (n 69) 33–34. In this report the authors discuss the proposed Data Protection
Regulation, as it was then at the time the report was written.
74 For instance, Laurie and others (n 69) 34, who state at n 50 that ‘. . . there is concern over how the
Regulation would impact (negatively) upon the processing of personal data for health and biomedical pur-
poses. The Wellcome Trust has consistently opposed drafts of the GDPR, which purport to turn pseudony-
mous data into a subset of personal data that would interfere with publicly beneficial research from being
carried out.’
75 Information that ‘does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to data rendered anony-
mous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable’.
76 Gabe Maldoff, ‘Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 8 – Pseudonymization’ (12 February 2016)
<https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-8-pseudonymization/> accessed
8 April 2019.
77 There is a recognition that as technology develops data that have previously been annoymised may become
identifiable. The Irish Data Protection Commission states it is: ‘likely that more advanced data processing
techniques than currently exist will be developed in the future that may diminish any current anonymisation
techniques. It is also likely that more data sets will be released into the public domain, allowing for cross
comparison between datasets. Both of these developments will make it more likely that individual records
can be linked between datasets in spite of any anonymisation techniques employed, and ultimately that indi-
viduals can be identified.’ See <https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/guidance-landing/anonymisation-and-
pseudonymisation> accessed 21 May 2019. Reasonable measures must be taken against reidentification,
but arguably this could not extend to pre-empting future specific technological advances.
78 Laurie and others (n 69) 3B and 3B3.













niversity user on 06 August 2019
secrecy or any other significant economic or social disadvantage to the natural
person concerned.79
It remains to be seen how such definitions of damage/harm will be applied under the
GDPR, but arguably, although broader than the DPD by the inclusion of non-
material damage, the GDPR could retain a relatively narrow construction of these
terms in practice. Article 82(3) also provides an exemption for controllers/processers
from liability if they can prove that they are ‘not in any way responsible for the event
giving rise to the damage’.
In contrast to this approach—and in addition to the aforementioned differences
between HMBs and DPAs acting under the remit of the GDPR—HMBs would seek
to employ a broad definition and application of harm arising from data use.80 HMBs
would recognise physical, psychological, and financial harms experienced by individu-
als if on the balance of probabilities, it is plausible that this harm is connected to data
use. Instead of looking towards a strict traditional legal classification of harm which
generally relies on causality to the loss suffered, the HMB (i) would adopt a lower
threshold to prove causality such that the individual need only to prove that there is a
plausible link between the harm suffered and the data use(s). It would also not need
to be a proven link between an action by a specific data controller and the harm.
Instead, in recognition of the pervasive nature of data, it would be enough to prove a
plausible link between multiple data uses and the harm(s) arising. (ii) Drawing on
Laurie and others’ findings and recommendations,81 HMBs would look at harm in the
sense of how individuals were ‘impacted’ by data use when assessing the significance of
the harm looking at the extent to which this was harmful to the individual(s). This
broader classification of harm is needed to support individuals in an era where deci-
sions are increasingly supported—or even driven—by data. Also, whilst Article 82(1)
refers to compensation being awarded based on ‘damage suffered’, HMBs could go
beyond this because the financial support that HMBs can offer is not limited to dam-
age suffered but extends to other harms. Furthermore, although harms arising outside
79 See also Recital 75; art 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Personal Data Breach Notification under
Regulation 2016/679’ adopted on 3 October 2017 (Revised and Adopted on 6 February 2018) 6.
80 For a discussion of cases on this, under the previous DPA and limits on see Laurie and others (n 69) 7B1F;
see also Jones and others (n 24).
81 These recommendations were made in the health and biomedical data context, whereby Laurie and others
highlighted harms arising from data use and abuse perceived/experienced by individuals and social groups
outside those covered under the previously applicable Data Protection Directive by focusing on the notion
of ‘impact’ from data use. Laurie and others (n 69) 161 state that:
. . . for example, an individual might experience an impact if her/his data are used without
permission, even if this is perfectly legal. Equally, organisations handling data might suffer an
impact in trust and allegiance if individuals or groups whose data are held and used perceive
an adverse impact through uses of which they disapprove. This is not to suggest that ground-
less concerns or abstract fears should drive information governance practices. Rather –as our
soft evidence base suggests – the range of considerations about what might be construed as
harmful is far wider than the law alone recognises. As such, the lesson is that due attention
should be paid to possible impacts when using health and biomedical data, and to ensuring
that governance mechanisms and actors within them have the ability to assess and, where ap-
propriate, respond to data subjects’ expectations.
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the GDPR may be actionable in other ways, eg as breaches of human rights under the
ECHR, HMBs provide a more expedient and less costly way for individuals to report
and request support for such harms.82
Nonetheless, as noted above, the HMB system is complementary to existing legal
protections under data protection frameworks and is expected to be used by individu-
als who do not have claims under traditional legal remedies. For instance, the HMB
would take claims that fell outside the scope of current laws where, eg harm resulted
from anonymised data, harm resulted to a secondary data subject, or harm occurred
from lawful data use. In such cases, affected individuals could bring a petition to the
HMB. However, to avoid duplication, although individuals who have a traditional
claim are not barred from applying to the HMB, individuals are not be able to appeal
to HMBs if other legal actions are in progress, eg human rights claims or claims under
the GDPR. Instead, if a legal claim started in the course of a petition to the HMB, a
stay on the petition would operate until the legal action was concluded. The HMB
could then continue to consider the petition. However, as it is intended as a support
mechanism for individuals and does not act as compensation, therefore if someone
was compensated by the legal framework, the HMB petition would be unlikely to lead
to further financial rewards as that individual’s harm would already be financially miti-
gated against by law. Nonetheless, other supports might be granted to such individuals83
and petitions would also be used to inform the governance feedback loop created by
HMBs.
2. HMBs and subsidiarity: addressing harms falling outside existing protections
As mentioned, despite provisions in the GDPR which seek to address some of the
challenges posed by big data, important gaps remain, which HMBs could help ad-
dress. For example, as noted above, Article 22(1) GDPR states that:
the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely
on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects con-
cerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her (emphasis added).
Where profiling is defined in Article 4 GDPR as:
any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of using those
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular
to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at
work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, be-
haviour, location or movements.
82 In this respect, the administrative costs of running HMBs would be monitored particularly at the initial
stages of the system and would need to adapt accordingly. For example, if it transpired that individuals were
more inclined to use the informal HMB facility rather than look to traditional legal remedies, then there
would, for instance, need to be a percentage increase in the amount that each data controller would pay to
the HMB.
83 Examples would include the recommendation by an HMB to reinstate credit worthiness that was negatively
affected by association.
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However, the effect of the provision is limited by the fact that it refers only to process-
ing of an individual’s ‘personal data’ used in a manner to ‘evaluate certain personal
aspects’ relating to that person84 and is only applicable where there is no human inter-
vention evident in the processing. Only fully automated data analytics fall within this,
and those not fully automated—even if they include humans in an relatively insignifi-
cant manner, eg to sign off the decisions of the machine—do not fall within the remit
of the protection (for further exceptions see below).85 As Article 4 also relates to per-
sonal data as defined in the regulation it is unlikely—given the specific use of ‘that nat-
ural person’ in the article—that this would apply to data of individuals used to make
predictions which impact upon a secondary data user. Furthermore, the right does
not apply if covered by the exceptions in Article 22(2) that allow automated process-
ing if the decision is necessary for the performance of a contract between data subject
and controller based on the data subject’s explicit consent; or if it is ‘authorised by
Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays
down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legiti-
mate interests’.86 Whilst the Article 29 Working Party guidance has highlighted limits
placed on these caveats, such as having a narrow construction of necessity in the con-
text of performance of a contract,87 nonetheless, the practical effect of Article 22 is sig-
nificantly curtailed by such caveats.
The GDPR also explicitly prohibits using sensitive data (or special categories of
data) for automated decision-making purposes, unless the data controller has imple-
mented measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights,88 and that the data subject has
explicitly consented to processing, and the processing is for a legitimate aim.89
Nonetheless, this fails to address the fact that even with such safeguards in place,
harm can still occur, in view of the aforementioned effect of big data where people do
not know what actions exactly led to harm, and where they sometimes do not even
know that data were used that proved harmful to them.90 Moreover, individuals may
not have access to legal remedies, eg if it is a secondary data subject who is harmed.
The GDPR also recognises the risk of discriminatory decision-making arising from
profiling.91 These include Recital 75 which recognises that algorithms can be used in
a way that causes indirect discriminatory effects for certain individuals ‘even if those
organisations had no knowledge of the discrimination and did not intend to
84 For a discussion of provisions, see Olivier Proust, ‘Getting to Know the GDPR, Part 5: Your Big Data
Analytics and Profiling Activities May Be Seriously Curtailed’ (FieldFisher, 4 December 2015)<http://priva
cylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2015/getting-to-know-the-gdpr-part-5-your-big-data-analytics-and-profiling-ac
tivities-may-be-seriously-curtailed/> accessed 8 April 2019.
85 As noted above art 29 Working Party guidance, endorsed by EDPB stated it must be meaningful human ac-
tion, not token. art 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling
for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679 adopted on 3 February 2017 WP251.01, 21.
86 art 22(2)(b).
87 Art 29 Working Party Guidance (n 85) 13.
88 Samantha Sayers and James Drury-Smith , ‘Legislative Comment: GDPR Series: How to Operationalise
Profiling for Your Organisation’ (2016) 17(1) Privacy and Data Protection 3, 5.
89 See art 9(2)(a) and (g) as cited in Sayers and Drury-Smith, ibid 5.
90 Dixon and Gellman (n 65).
91 See Recitals 71 and 75 GDPR, see discussion in Ann Bevitt and Laura Dietschy, ‘Legislative Comment:
GDPR Series: The Risks with Data Profiling’ (2016) 17(2) Privacy and Data Protection 7.
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discriminate’92 and legal protections against discrimination could be employed in such
contexts. Guidance from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office emphasises the
need for data controllers to take steps to prevent bias and discrimination resulting
from profiling.93 However, in this context, the focus is again on the processing of ‘per-
sonal data’94 and the scope and effect of this provision in the ‘big data’ era remain to
be seen. Moreover, as is well known, despite the GDPR’s goal to remove national dif-
ferences in data protection standards, it leaves ample room for national derogations,
and for different interpretations of key terms such as ‘public interest’ or ‘appropriate
safeguards’. In sum, the GDPR leaves room for individuals to be harmed in a big data
context which HMBs could help address.
3. Financial support fund: appeals process
Turning next to the practical operation of the financial support function, three main
questions arise which will be addressed briefly here.
a. Who could apply to the HMB for financial support and on what grounds?
Given the focus on collective risk management/benefits, any natural person could ap-
ply for financial support if they could make a plausible case that they have experienced
significant and undue harm by data use. An important feature of HMBs is that it they
would also be open to appeals from secondary data subjects—individuals whose own
data have not been used, but who have been harmed by the use of other people’s
data. Since there is no recognised relationship between the data controller and a sec-
ondary data subject under traditional legal approaches, it is questionable what duties
the controller would have to such subjects within existing frameworks. However, third
parties have been recognised as having rights in other contexts, such as within contract
law,95 or insurance law.96 In the big data context, where ‘secondary harms’ will occur
more frequently, effective protections are imperative in the recognition of individuals’
commitment to big data, and to ensure fairness given the power disparity between
individuals and data controllers. The openness of HMBs to providing support to sec-
ondary data subjects is an expression of collective responsibility for harm resulting
from any kind of data use. Importantly, as noted, the HMB would initially only allow
claims from natural persons and not from corporate entities.
There would also be no time-limit on claims to the HMB. This is because general
statutory limitation periods are designed for public policy reasons, namely: (i) it is un-
fair for companies or individuals to be challenged on basis of old allegations of
92 ibid.
93 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Guide to the GDPR’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-
automated-decision-making-including-profiling/> accessed 25 June 2019.
94 Defined in the regulation as: art 4: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifi-
able natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data,
an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
95 In the UK context, the relevant legislation is the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
96 In the UK context, the relevant legislation is the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010.
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wrongdoing as evidence to prove or refute a civil action may become difficult to ver-
ify/obtain if a substantial period has elapsed between the alleged wrongdoing and
time of the action being raised and (ii) there should be a certain period of time after
which a wrongdoer should not have the threat of legal action.97 However, HMBs are
designed on the basis of no-fault and as noted applicants apply for support from the
HMB not the data controller, and the requirement is based on plausible connection
to the data use in the HMB context which will be a lower requirement to establish
than the chain of legal causation required for traditional actions. Moreover, HMBs
would be an instantiation of a collective commitment to support those who were
harmed by (lawful or unlawful) data use and an acknowledgement that not all risks
are foreseeable in the context of big data. In this spirit, depending on the severity of
the harm and reasons for not taking a claim earlier, financial support could still be
made at a time removed from the initial data uses. However, there would need to be a
justifiable reason for the delay in making a claim to the HMB in cases where the harm
was discovered long before the claim was applied for.
b. How would a claim be made to the HMB, and how would payments (if any) be
assessed?
As briefly sketched above, a key feature of HMBs and their financial support mecha-
nism is that they simple to use, and thus bureaucracy would be kept as low as possible
as a key objective. Therefore, a simple letter describing how a person has been harmed
and how the person thinks this harm was caused (at least in part) by data collected or
used by the data controller would be sufficient to be considered by the HMB. The
HMB would then conduct an investigation into the matter. This could mirror the ap-
proach adopted by bodies such as the Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) compensation
system that offers financial support to individuals involved in a motor accident where
the other party was uninsured, or where the other party is untraceable (eg if they left
the scene of the accident) or for UK residents involved in accidents with foreign regis-
tered vehicles either in the UK or EU.98 Under the MIB scheme, claimants must sub-
mit a claim form99 including details of the incident where they are claiming injury/
loss arose from, and supporting documents/details including witness/police reports,
etc. Following receipt of the form the MIB then conducts an investigation which
includes: ‘establishing the facts; confirming the identity of those involved; obtaining
independent reports from motor engineers or witnesses; obtaining a police report;
contacting other bodies such as the DVLA, your insurer or a foreign bureau’.100
Claims are dealt with within 3 months generally.
Similarly, under the HMB, an individual would submit a claim form to the national
HMB, providing a description of the harm suffered and circumstances of this,
97 The relevant legislation is the Limitations Act 1980 (as amended) applicable in England and Wales, which
provides for a 3-year limitation period for claims for compensation for personal injury. For claims in tort
other than for personal injury, the limitation period is generally 6 years from the date of the damage is
sustained.
98 See <https://www.mib.org.uk/making-a-claim/what-we-do/> accessed 25 June 2019. It remains to be
seen how Brexit and leaving the EU will impact upon this.
99 <https://www.mib.org.uk/media/418096/mib_claim_form_v0618_v2a.pdf> accessed 8 April 2019.
100 <https://www.mib.org.uk/media/216242/your-guide-to-making-an-mib-claim.pdf> accessed 8 April 2019, 11.
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alongside supporting evidence including, for instance, medical reports, etc depending
on the harm allegedly suffered. The HMB would then consider such supporting evi-
dence and could request independent assessments/opinions from data experts in de-
ciding on the claim, and/or enter a dialogue with the applicant to obtain further
evidence or information. A key difference between the MIB scheme and the process
envisaged for HMBs is that under the former, compensation is fault based—it is only
paid where fault is established on the part of driver that the claimant considers respon-
sible and if the claimant is wholly/partly responsible, compensation may be reduced
or not paid.101 The HMB, in contrast, would work on a no-fault basis and financial
support could be paid even if the data use was outside the scope of relevant laws, pro-
vided sufficient harm arising from data use could be demonstrated, and that it was
plausible this resulted from the data use.
If the HMB was satisfied that the harm suffered was significant, that it was undue,
and that there was a plausible causation to data use, it could do any or all of the fol-
lowing (i) acknowledge the harm and issue an apology to the applicant on behalf of
the data controller(s); (ii) feed information back to data controllers and policy mak-
ers, with the aim of improving procedures and rules to avoid such harm from occur-
ring in the future; (iii) make financial payments to support the harmed party under
the financial support mechanism.
c. How would the decision-making process operate?
HMBs would be governed by an independent steering committee who would develop
a framework of criteria for decision-making by the HMB. This framework would be
made publicly available. As noted above, HMBs would have appeals panels who hear
and decide on appeals from residents of that country who complain of harm.
Members of HMB appeals panels would include ‘lay’ members in their capacity as
patients, etc, but also experts in data protection, marketing, security—depending on
the size and remit of the HMB. Based on the decision-making framework, members
of appeals panels would be free to consider any aspect that they deemed relevant pro-
vided the following conditions were met: (i) evidence of physical, psychological, fi-
nancial, or reputational harm (ii) a plausible case, on the balance of probabilities,
would be made that the harm resulted, at least in part, from data collected or used by
an organisation within the remit of the HMB. They would then decide what response
would be adequate to the harm experienced by the appealing party, as noted above:
an official acknowledgement of the harm with an explanation of what will be done to
avoid similar issues happening in the future, and/or providing financial support.
HMBs would need adequate financial resources to manage such a system and to en-
sure the independence of members to avoid issues of regulatory capture.
C. Evaluation and Feedback on Governance Systems
As noted, alongside the financial support mechanism, HMBs would have an advisory
role and would be required to produce an annual report providing an overview of the
types and distribution of claims to the fund that it investigated and the outcomes of
101 ibid 11.
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these. This should be used to feed into good practice recommendations on data use
as the HMB would be in an ideal position to assess how harms materialised in the
previous year by having an overview of such challenges. In this role as a collector
and analyst of the evidence on the frequency, nature, and severity of harms resulting
from data use, HMBs could collaborate with DPAs—although also here, their role
would go beyond the remit of the DPA which is limited to harms arising from unlaw-
ful data use.
The feedback role of HMBs would form part of a process of reflexive gover-
nance.102 If, for instance, multiple claims were received in relation to a specific harm
being caused by a data practice, this should highlight a pattern which would be identi-
fiable by the HMB. HMBs could further investigate and highlight harm causing practi-
ces and could also seek to develop strategies of improvement and/or mitigation.
The feedback role is an important reason for having HMBs at a national level, since
this would allow patterns of use to be identified across the country which should lead
to deeper insights than for instance if HMBs were to operate on a specific industry or
organisational level. Moreover, as harms are increasingly being triggered by issues that
arise when data sets are shared across different areas and the combination of multiple
data sets, having such an overarching national body would allow a more coherent and
comprehensive picture to be drawn. This should also help avoid the risk of some
problems being missed, since a too narrow focus on a particular sector/industry might
lead to ignoring the pervasive nature of the data use and harms triggered in the con-
text of big data.
In addition, having a national body would allow comparisons to be made in terms
of the types of petitions which are refused support by HMBs. If a pattern of refusals
occurred in a particular context over time, it might require HMBs to reconsider how
such petitions are being evaluated, or what should be fed back to corporate data users
in such contexts to ensure that a gap between what individuals feel is acceptable and
data uses occurring would be recognised. Where petitions were refused because harm
was not plausibly connected to the data use, but multiple petitioners complained
about the same practice, this could illustrate misplaced fears individuals might have
about data use—which, if allowed to continue, could hamper beneficial progress of
big data. If such patterns were detected by HMBs, they could be addressed by reassur-
ing individual petitioners that harm was not plausibly connected with data use and
also by further educational campaigns demonstrating how big data operates.
Article 35 GDPR provides that for processing using new technologies likely to re-
sult in high risks to the rights of natural persons, controllers are required to conduct
assessments on the protection of personal data.103 However, gaps will remain, given
the difficulties in fore-sighting technologies and the challenges specific to big data.
The feedback role intended by HMBs fills this gap and is intended to complement
102 Laurie (n 61).
103 See Information Commissioner’s Office guidance on Data Protection Assessments <https://ico.org.uk/
for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/account
ability-and-governance/data-protection-impact-assessments/> accessed 25 June 2019; art 29 Working
Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is
“likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 248 rev.01 as adopted
by EDPB<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id¼611236>.
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the forward-looking role of such impact assessments. This feedback role would also
complement the role of Supervisory Authorities in each country under Article 57
GDPR. Such authorities are responsible for monitoring and enforcing the GDPR, and
also ‘monitor relevant developments, insofar as they have an impact on the protection
of personal data, in particular the development of information and communication
technologies and commercial practices’.104 HMBs would complement this role, as
while the Supervisory Authorities are likely to focus on issues arising due to failure to
comply with the GDPR, HMBs look beyond this by considering harms arising regard-
less of the lawfulness of processing under the GDPR, and for all data uses not just
uses of personal data.
D. Operational Overview
As noted, HMBs could be established at the national level, in which case they would
be tax-funded (on the understanding that corporate data users would contribute
to this through the tax that they pay).105 Key feature is that they would be
independent of the organisation, that is, the data controller, using the data and who
review appeals from people who claim they have been harmed by data use. In the
latter case, HMBs would be funded by a set percentage of the budget of each research
project or of the overall institutional budget (depending on the form of organisation
in question) being set aside for this, initially set, eg, at 1%.
We also recognise that part of the issue with the governance of big data is that the
sharing and integration of data sets between institutions and organisations can give
rise to harms that may occur from the combined use of data sets from different people
across borders. In recognition of this, and of that fact that data given to one organisa-
tion (provided appropriate consent was given) can be used for other purposes which
could create knock-on benefits in other contexts and jurisdictions, we suggest that if
data users reside in several countries, the individual would apply to the one where she
herself is a resident.106 (While in this article we have used UK/European laws as an
exemplar, we would hope that gradually other countries would adopt similar harm
mitigation institutions and instruments.)
We envisage that a national HMB would be an independent arm of, and overseen
by, the Information Commissioner’s Office in the UK and equivalent bodies in other
jurisdictions. Furthermore, there would be a national advisory committee/board deal-
ing with HMBs which would have annual meetings and issue annual reports to the
104 art 57(1)(i) GDPR.
105 Over time as HMBs develop, it may be decided that alongside national HMBs, institutions/organisations
could establish their own HMBs. A key feature is that they would be independent of the organisation, that
is, the data controller, using the data and who review appeals from people who claim they have been harmed
by data use. Such HMBs would be funded by a set percentage of the budget of each research project or of
the overall institutional budget (depending on the form of the organisation in question) being set aside for
this, initially set, eg, at 1%.
106 This model rests on the assumption that on balance, the proportion of petitioners claiming harms for which
financial support would be paid out corresponds with the proportion of funds coming into national HMBs
via corporations residing in these countries (for example, Finnish users would experience harms from data
use by a company residing in the USA). When this is not the case, an international mechanism to balance
costs between countries would need to be implemented. Within Europe, this could be addressed by EU
law.
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public. Representatives of data controllers would be invited to attend such meetings,
and this would provide a forum for delegates to meet and exchange experiences or ad-
dress common issues arising. Over time subcommittees might also be established to
provide a more specific forum tailored to particular industries, eg the health context.
However, given that many harms are systemic, these committees would not replace
the national meetings and instead would be designed more as awareness raising meet-
ings translating the overarching issues into relevant contexts for each sector. The advi-
sory board would receive annual reports from the HMB steering committee and
appeals panels and use these to develop national standards/guidance documents.
Ultimately, HMBs at a European or even international level could also be established,
recognising that much research is not nation specific, and data flow across
jurisdictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Novel practices of curating, storing, and using digital data require new ways of think-
ing about data governance. The individual focus in legal frameworks is no longer suffi-
cient to capture the interests at stake or tackle the power asymmetries and inequities
in costs and benefits of data use in the digital era. Moreover, key requirements of tra-
ditional legal remedies for corporate misuse of data—such as proving fault or
causality—are no longer feasible in an era, where data use is regularly not traceable.
In addition, significant harms regularly occur from lawful data use. In an effort to in-
crease collective responsibility for harms that people experience from data use,
whether lawful or not, we have sketched out the instruments of HMBs. We argue that
HMBs provide a mechanism to address some of the power asymmetries that mark
data use in the digital era. They provide support for individuals harmed by data use/
misuse by offering mechanisms of financial support to individuals, where no existing
legal remedies are available. They also provide a mechanism for the reporting of data
governance issues, thereby offering a reflexive governance tool that is vital for emerg-
ing areas of data governance and particularly for big data in the digital context given
the pace at which this area is developing. We expect there to be aspects of HMBs that
need further elaboration and refinement before these bodies can be considered for im-
plementation. Towards this end, we hope this article will stimulate debate and inspire
colleagues to help us to improve and develop this idea further.
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